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VOLATILITY OF EQUILIBRIUM STOCK PRICES
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the impact of heterogeneous information
among traders on market efficiency and the volatility of stock prices.
After modeling the hehavior of the traders in market equilibrium, this
paper shows that 1) the volatility of equilihrium stock prices
increases prior to disclosure of public information; 2) this phenome-
non can be attributed to the speculative behavior of traders with
heterogeneous information. More importantly, the paper also shows that
this speculative behavior itself is the driving force for the efficient
pricing mechanism. Thus, the increase in the volatilitv of stock prices
prior to disclosure of public information is not inconsistent with the
market efficiency hypothesis. These results also provide some important
implications for event studies.

HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION, MARKET EFFICIENCY AND THE
VOLATILITY OF EQUILIBRIUM STOCK PRICES
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, a number of studies have examined the
impact of various "pubLic information" on stock prices and their vola-
tilities to test market efficiency. Given the popularity of the event
studies in the literature, it is remarkable that little attention has
been paid to the underlying information adjustment process itself. As
pointed out bv Brown, Lockwood and Lummer fll, the characteristic common
to the event studies is the attempt to quantifv the Influence of
otherwise qualitative events.
The predominant methodology adopted in the event studies is the
residual analysis based on capital asset pricing models (e.g., Sharpe
[15] and its variations). In these studies, the coefficients of the
return-generating model are assumed to remain constant for the
predetermined time interval on either side of the event date. One of
the event studies quoted quite often in the literature is the
consideration of the effects of stock splits on share prices by Fama,
Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR) [4], They found significant changes in
the average variance of the residuals of the return-generating model
(i.e., heteroscedasticity) during the months constituting the split
period. The heteroscedasticity has been substantiated also by other
studies in different contexts, questioning the validitv of the return-
generating model (see for example Hsu [10], Giaccotto and Ali [5] and
Brown, Lockwood and Lummer [1]).
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However, the previous studies to our knowledge have not investigated
directly the underlying information adjustment process itself in relation
to market efficiency and why the heteroscedasticity is so widespread,
even though informally discussed in some study such as FFJR.
Relatedly, several studies (LeRoy and Porter [12], Shiller [16,
17], and Grossman and Shiller [7]), have examined the variability of
stock, prices in terms of the fundamental factors of the intrinsic value
of common stocks to assess market efficiency. Tne valuation model
commonly used by financial economists asserts that corporation stock
prices equal the present values of future cash flows (i.e., dividends)
discounted by appropriate rates. LeRoy and Porter [12] and Shiller [16]
have tested whether movements in stock prices can be explained by
information about the numerator of the present value model (i.e.,
subsequent dividends) assuming a constant discount rate. The conclusion
that these studies have in common is that stock prices are too volatile
to accord with efficient markets, and thus the variability of stock
prices cannot be accounted for simply by information regarding the
future dividend payments. On the other hand, Grossman and Shiller [7]
have considered whether the substantial volatility of stock prices can
be attributed to information regarding discount interest rates. Using
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and
consumption in the future, they provide a convincing evidence that the
unexpected high variability of stock prices cannot be explained by the
discount factor either. In addition, Shiller [16] has argued also that
"the failure of the efficient markets model is thus so dramatic that it
would be impossible to attribute the failure to such things as data
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errors, price Index problems, or changes in tax Laws." However, it is
important to note that the "efficient market" models employed in the
previous studies are on the fundamental assumption that informations in
the market are homogeneous across all traders.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the behavior of traders who
have heterogeneous information and to investigate its impact on market
efficiency and the volatility of stock prices. In particular, this paper
shows that I) the volatility of equilibrium stock prices increases prior
to disclosure of public information; 2) this phenomenon can be attributed
to the speculative behavior of traders with heterogeneous information.
More importantly, this paper also shows that the speculative behavior
itself is the driving force for the efficient pricing mechanism. Thus the
increase in the volatility of stock prices prior to disclosure of public
information is not inconsistent with the concept of market efficiency.
These results provide some important implications for the event studies.
In the presence of a series of public information over time, this study
also sheds a light on the long-time controversy why the variability of
stock prices is so much dramatic.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models, under some
simple assumptions, the behavior of traders who have heterogenous
information, and Section 3 derives some implications of the model
regarding the volatility of stock prices and its relation with the
efficient market hypothesis. Section 4 contains a brief summary.
2. EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION
Let us consider a simplified world in which stocks of a single
firm are traded and there are large but equal number N of buyers and
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sellers. Prior Lo puhLic release of new information, investors wi L
1
have the incentive to privately learn ahout the nature of forthcoming
information. Unless private information is perfect across all
investors, they will trade stocks hased on their private
(heterogeneous) information and thus new information may be reflected
in stock prices prior to its public release. Following Hirshleifer
[9], such markets will be called "speculative" markets. Tf new infor-
mation is publicly released at discrete points in time, investors may
speculate between consecutive time points of public information.
However, as the time until public information approaches zero,
investors' expectations will be more homogeneous and, therefore, spe-
culative opportunities will disappear with disclosure of public infor-
mation.
Denote buyers' and sellers' expected stock prices prior to disclo-
sure of public information by v and v, respectively, where v > v. In
addition, let us assume that buyers' and sellers' preferences are
characterized by the following short-term trading profit functions,
respectively:
(1) u. = v - c for buyer
u~ = d - _v for seller,
where c is the striking price plus the cost of searching the best
striking price (for buyer) and d represents the striking prices less
3
the cost of searching the best striking price (for seller). For
analvtic convenience, each buyer and seller is assumed to trade exact Lv
one share of the stock if and onlv if his or her expected profit is non-
negative (i.e., Fu.
_> and Eu„ _> 0). Buyers are indexed by per seller
search cost s, where k(s) = l/a(v - v_) is the prohability density of s
with support o < s «! a( v - v) and a is a positive constant. On the
other hand, sellers are indexed by per buyer search cost t, where
l(t) = l/a(v - v) is the probability density of t with support
o < t v a(v - v) . Thus, Nk(s) and N£(t) represent the number of
buvers of type s and the number of selLers of type t, respectively,
and the search costs are smaller if and only if buyers' and sellers'
expectations are more homogeneous. Note that buyers and sellers are
identically distributed with respect to their search costs. Since
buyers in one period may become sellers in another period and vice
versa, the identical distribution assumption appears reasonable.
Assume that buvers (sellers) know the probability distribution of
the stock prices x (v) that sellers (buyers) are willing to selL (pay)
for. Denote by F(x) and G(y) the probability distribution functions
of x and y with support x I x < x and x \ y < x for buyers and
•
,
4
sellers, respectively.
Following McCall [4], the optimal buver behavior can be described
as follows. Consider a buver of type s, and suppose that is the
smallest of the x values that he/she has observed. If an additional
seller is randomlv sampled, the gross increase of his/her expected
profit is
(2) 4>(0) " / (O-x)dF(x) = f F(x)dx.
X X
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Since the additional sampLe costs s, the huyer wi L L search the market
untiL x < 0(s), where the critical value of 0(s) is determined hy the
marginality condition
(3) s = cf.(Q(s)).
Since 4>(Q) is increasing:
(4) d,'(0) = F(0) >
for all > x, huyers are likely to search more in the average if
and only if their search costs are smaller.
Following the same logic, the optimal sequential search strategy
of a seller of type t can he described as: continue searching if an x
< R(t) is observed; and trade with the buver if he/she is willing to
pay an x
_> R(t), where the threshold R(t) solves
x
(5) t = f [y - R(t)]dO(y)
R(t)
for all < t < a(v - v). Define
x x
(6) i|>(R) = / [y-R]dC(y) = / fl-G(v)ldv
R R
for all x ; R <' x. Then, condition (5) can be written as
(7) t = iKR(O)
for all t. Since ty (R) is decreasing:
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(8) 4"(R) = -[l-G(R)] <
for alL R < x, sellers are likely to search more in the average if
and onlv if their search costs are smaller.
Theorem 1. If a market equilihrium exists, and it is characterized hy
distrihution functions F(x) and G(x) with support x \ x < x, the
following must then hold (see Appendix A for proof),
(a) v<x<x<v;
x
(h) / F(x)dx <__ a(v -v)
;
x
X
(c) f [1 - G(x)]dx <_ a(v -v);
x
(d) (/ [I - C(v)]dv| • F'(x) = 1 - C(x);
x
(e) [/ F(y)dy| • G'(x) = F(x);
x
for all x \ x < x
Theorem 2 . If the search cost parameter a is not too large (ira < 2),
then market equilihrium exists and is characterized hy the following
(see Appendix B for proof):
(a) F(x) sin r(x - x)
;
(b) G(x) = 1 - cos r(x - x);
(c) x - x = T>p
for all x
_< x < x, where
(9) v _< x <
-f— • Min{ (2-7T-Hra)v + (2-ira)v, (4-ir ) [ ( L-a)v + av_ ]
}
and
(10) ( l-a)v + a"v - x_ < — < —Zn ' Min i ^ 1_a )v + av - x, ~- a(v-v)}.
The following implications are immediate frum Theorems 1 and 2:
i) The price dispersion (x - x) is larger if either search costs are
larger (i.e., a is larger) or traders' expectations get more heterogen-
eous (i.e., v - v gets larger); ii) The price dispersion is positively
related to the search cost parameter (a(v - v)).
3. VOLATILITY AND MARKF.T KFFICEFNCY
In the previous section, we have shown that equilibrium stock pri-
ces prior to disclosure of public information (let us calL it the
"speculative price" as opposed to the "normal price" subsequent to
public information) critically depends on speculators' searching behav-
ior due to heterogeneous information. In order to examine the
voLatiLity of speculative prices relative to the one of normal prices
and its relation with market efficiency, let us consider an arbitrarv
but fixed period from time t = to time x = 1. For analytic tract-
ability, we assume that the relevant state for the period is realized
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at x = 0, but that the state information is to be made public at t =
1. Denote by v the equilibrium stock price that is to be reaLized
subsequent to public information at x = 1. Consider the speculative
market at time T (0 < T < 1). Since the price v is not likely to be
known to investors at the time x, some investors' estimates of v may
be larger than others' unless private information is homogeneous.
Denote bv v(x ) and v(x ) speculative sellers' and buyers' estimates of
v at time x < 1, respectively. The speculation market is then active
at x if and onlv if y_(x ) < v(x).
In order to avoid indeterminate striking prices for speculative
trading, let us assume that speculative sellers are Stackelberg
leaders: a seller of type t sets his/her selling price at the indivi-
dual reservation price R(t) and waits until a buyer who is willing to
pay the price arrives. Given this assumption, the speculative price
or actual striking price x is distributed by F(x|x) at time x, and
thus its mean can be written as
x(T)
i ,
(11) E(x|t) = f x dF(x|x) = x(t) +-A- (^ -1)
. % - r(x) 2
x(x )
where the quantities x(x ) and r(x ) satisfy (9) and (10).
Let us define
(12) b(x) = F.(x|x) - v and z(t ) = x(x) - E(x|x)
for < x < 1. The quantity b(x ) measures the deviation of the
average speculative price from the stock price subsequent to public
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inf ormation. We shall call b(x ) speculators' average bias . Depending
upon the reliability of their private information, speculators may be
biased positively (b(x)
_> 0) or negatively (b(x) <_ 0). On the other
hand, the variable z(x ) measures the deviation of an actual striking
price from its mean. We shall call z(x) speculators' trading risk
component . Note that the trading risk z(x) is "small" if and only if
the price dispersion x(t ) - x_(f ) of speculative prices x(x) is small.
Then, the speculative price x(x) at time t (0 < t < 1) can be written
as
:
(13) x(t) = v + b(x) + z(x).
Furthermore, the trading risk z(x) can be characterized by
7T - 3
(14) E[z(x)l = and Var[z(x)] =
where
[r(x)l 2
(15) < —^ <: afv(x) - v(x) ].
r(x ) — —
Equation (13) implies that speculators are exposed to three
risks: the volatility of the normal price v (i.e., the intrinsic risk of
the firm); the risk due to errors of heterogeneous information (b(x));
and, the trading risk of speculators (z(x)). Then it becomes clear
that the speculative price x(x ) must be more volatiLe than the normal
price v unless the normal price v, the average bias b(x) and the
trading risk z(x ) are negatively correlated. Recall that the results
are based on the assumption that speculative sellers are StackeLberg
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leaders. However, we mav assume alternatively that speculative buyers
are Stackelberg leaders. Since the equilibrium speculative price must
be distributed between the two distribution functions F(x) and G(x), all
of the results in this paper should be intact with only minor changes
even when neither buyers nor sellers are Stackelberg leaders.
It can be easilv shown also that the higher volatility of stock prices
prior to disclousre of public information is not inconsistent with the
efficient market hypothesis and the very speculative activities are
driving forces of the efficient pricing mechanism as long as speculators
are less biased as the time to subsequent information approaches zero:
(16) lim [v(x) - v] = lim [v(x) - v] =
T+l T+ 1
In order to see this, let us rewrite equation (13) as
[X(T) - V] 2 = fb(t)] 2 + 2b(T)z(T) + fz(T)] 2 .
Then,
(17) E[x(x) - v] 2 = fb(x)l 2 + Varfz(t)]
(cf. (14)). Let e > be arbitrarv but fixed. Using the Chebvshev ine-
quality, we have
(18) Prob[ |x(x) - v| 2 > e ] _< - K[x(t) - v] 2 .
On the other hand, it follows from (12) that
(19) |b(i)l : Max[|v(x) - v|, |v(x)-v|].
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Also, (14) and (IS) yield
(20) Var[z(x)] < K • [
|
v(t ) -v|+|v-v(t)|] 2
where
2
K = (tt - 3)a .
Combining (17), (18), (19) and (20), we can obtain from (16):
(21) iim Probf |x(x ) - v
|
2
> e ] =0
Therefore, as long as speculators become less biased as the time to
public information disclosure approaches zero, the speculative price x( r
)
must converge to the normal price v with probability one. This implies
that the speculative behavior itself of investors with heterogeneous
information leads to the efficient market and thus the high volati-
lity of stock prices prior to public information disclosure is not
inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Conversely, spec-
ulation may take place if and onlv if the market is efficient. In
other words, to the extent that investors' heterogeneous information
is confirmed by subsequent disclosure of public information, market
efficiency appears necessary for rational speculation to occur.
The implication of the model developed in this paper for the
volatility of common stock prices may provide a direct explanation for
the observed structural changes in the return-generating model of the
event studies, suggesting the necessity of model refinements in testing
market efficiency.
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In addition, in the presence of infinite number of public information
disclosure over time, this implication of speculative behavior due to
heterogeneous information sheds a light on explaining the "substantial"
volatility of stock prices.
4 . SUMMARY
This paper analyzes the behavior of traders who have heterogeneous
information and investigates its impact on market efficiency and the
volatility of stock prices. In particular, it is shown that 1) the
volatilitv of equilibrium stock prices increases prior to disclosure of
public information; 2) this phenomenon can be attributed to the
speculative H^avior of traders with heterogeneous information. More
importantly, this paper also shows that the speculative behavior itself is
the driving force for the efficient pricing mechanism. Thus, the increase
in the volatility of stock prices prior to disclosure of public
information is not inconsistent with the concept of market efficiency.
These results provide some important implications for the event studies
and the long-time controversial issue, the "substantial" volatility of
stock prices.
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FOOTNOTES
The volatility measures have heen used to assess the information
processing efficiency in other markets: see for example ShilLer [18]
and Singleton [19] for bonds markets, and Huang [11] for foreign
currency markets.
2Several studies (e.g., Grossman [6], and Grossman and Stiglitz
[8]) have examined the competitive price system in different contexts,
i.e., how the price system conveys information from informed investors
to uninformed investors. However, it is important to note that
inherent in those studies is the assumption that information among the
informed investors is homogeneous.
3
It is important to note that even though nianv trades are
made through dealers or specialists in organized exchanges, its magni-
tude is small. For example, actual transactions with specialists
(as opposed to investors' trades among themselves) account for only 12
percent of the transactions in the New York Stock Exchange.
4
Since buyers and sellers are to be matched on a one-to-one basis,
both x and y values must have the same support.
5
From (12), x(t ) = v + [E(x|x - v] + [x(x) - E(x|r)]. Thus (13) is
x 2 o
obvious. In addition, Var[z(x)] = Var[x(x)] = f x dF(x|f) - E(x|x)\
x
where F(xjx) = sin f r(x )( x-x(t ) ] for x( x ) [ x < x(t) from Theorem 2, and
,
n
E(x|t) is given by (11). Therefore, Var[z(x)] - (tt-3 ) / [ r(x ) ] " can be
easily derived.
-15-
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem I
Result (a) is obvious since buyers' and sellers' expected trading
profits must be non-negative. Turning to result (b), assume that it
does not hold:
x
(Al) a("v - v ) < <J>(x) = / F(x)dx.
_x
Since 4>(Q) is strictly increasing by (4), this implies
(A2) Q[a(v - v)] < x
(apply the strictly increasing inverse
<J>
(•) of 4> ( * ) to (Al) and then use
(3)). It then follows from (A2) that no buyers are going to pay the pri-
ces x with 0[a(v - v)] < x < x: a contradiction to the fact that x
x < x is the support of G(x). Tn other words, condition (b) must hold
in equilibrium. The proof of result (c) is similar.
Now we consider result (d). Let x be fixed such that x < x < x.
F(x) is generated by the set of the reservation prices R(t) of sellers
of type t with R(t) < x conditional upon the constraint that x '. R(t) < x:
F(x) = Prob (R(t) < x|x_: R(t)
_< x}
.
Since R(t) < x if and only if t > 4>(x) bv (7) and (8), we have
f(x) = L / - i( t )dt - 1 -i$4
|^(x)/[a(v - v)]( <Kx) n-;
for all x < x < x. Differentiating the above with respect to x and then
using (6) and (8), we can easily obtain (d). Since the proof of result
(e) is similar, this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the system of differential equations:
(Bl) A F'(x) = 1 - G(x) and B G'(x) = F(x)
where
x x
A = f [1 - G(y)]dy and B = J F(y)dy
x x
(cf. (d) and (e) in Theorem 1). Eliminating F(x) from (Bl), we have
l 1J.L /
Setting
1(B3) r =
/ AB
we can write the solutiuon of (B2) in the form:
G(x) = 1 - c, cos(rx - c„)
for all x •' x < x, where c. and c 9 are integration constants. It then
follows from (Bl) that F(x) must have the form:
F(x) = Brc sin(rx - c )
for all x < x < x. Since F(x) = G(x) = 1, we must then have
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(B4) Br = 1; rx - c = rnr + — ; and c. = (-1)
Z Z 1
where n is an integer. Since Br = 1, (B3) yieLds
(B5) A = B = - .
r
Since F(x_) = G(x) = 0, we also have
(B6) rx - c = nrn ; and n - m = an even integer.
Since F(x) > and G(x) 1 for ail x \ x < x, however, the quantities
(rx - c 9 ) and (rx - c~ ) cannot differ hy more than — . Thus, n - m =
and (B6) can be rewritten as
(B6) ' rx - c
?
= rm .
As a result, we can obtain
rx - c 9
= r(x - x) + (rx - c„ ) = r(x - x_) + nir
and results (a)-(c) thus follow.
Turning to results (9) and (10), note that
(B7) <— < (v-v) • Min[a, -]
(cf. (a) and (b) in Theorem 1 and result x - x = =— ) , Also, observe
— 2r '
that buvers of type s with — < s < a(v-v) and sellers of tvpe t with
r
—
—
— < t ''. a (v-v) search the market only once since
X
1
X
1
xdF(x) = x , and f ydG(y) - x + — .
r — r
x x
-3-
Tn view of Lhe facts that
_
x
_
-
Eu,(s) = v - s - / xdF(x) -v-S-X-(«r-- I) —
x
for all — < s < a(v-v), and that Eu.(s) > 0, we must have
r — — I —
(B8) (j - I) - <_~v - a(v-v) - x » (l-a)v + av - x.
Similarly, we ohtain from Eu~(t)
_> for t = a(v-v) that
(B9) -
_> av + (l-a)v_ - x.
In other words, we must determine endogenously the quantities r and x
such that conditions (B7), (B8) and (B9) are satisfied. While tedious,
it is not difficult to show that results (9) and (10) follow from (B7),
(B8) and (B9). The proof of Theorem 2 is herewith completed.
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